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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES 
Appellants Victor Lawrence ("Mr. Lawrence") and Cindy Lawrence ("Ms. 
Lawrence") (collectively, the "Lawrences*) were married during the times relevant to this 
action but have since divorced. Although Ms. Lawrence has remarried and changed her 
name, this brief will refer to her as "Ms. Lawrence" for the sake of convenience. 
Appellee is Intermountain, Inc. ("Intermountain"). 
INTRODUCTION 
The gravamen of the Judgment against the Lawrences is Finding of Fact ("Initial 
Finding"), ^ 54, that Wayne Wong ("Mr. Wong") fraudulently failed to disclose to 
Intermountain he was promised $10,000 in exchange for his signature on the leases. 
However, unlike real property mortgages, the lease agreements at issue in this case (the 
"Leases") do not prohibit the payment of an inducement to Mr. Wong. Under the facts of 
this case and the law, there is nothing unlawful about an inducement offered to Mr. 
Wong. Since any such inducement is not unlawful, the finding of conspiracy to defraud 
must fail. There were no other unlawful acts upon which the lower court could base a 
finding of fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud. Intermountain concedes this, but asks the 
court to extrapolate a fraud from lawful activities, which extrapolation is not permitted 
under Utah law. 
Further, the judgment against the Lawrences for conversion fails because 
1 
Intermountain, fully aware it was leasing three vehicles to an entity or individuals other 
than Mr. Wong, waived its right to claim and is equitably estopped from claiming the 
Lawrences did not have the right to possess the vehicles when the leases were signed. 
Additionally, the lower court's imposition of punitive damages was in error, let 
alone such harsh punitive damages, because the underlying findings were in error. The 
Lawrences conduct was not unlawful, let alone did it rise to the level of malice necessary 
to award punitive damages. The lower court's inclusion of prejudgment interest in 
calculating punitive damages was in error. Accordingly, the lower court's judgment 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT 
SHOULD BE REVERSED 
A. An inducement is not unlawful 
A conspiracy to defraud is a "fraud committed by two or more persons who share 
intent to defraud another." Debry v. Cascade Entert., 879 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Utah 1994). 
In order to prevail on a claim of conspiracy to commit fraud, the plaintiff must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence the elements of fraud. See Gildea v. Guardian Title, 970 
P.2d 1265, 1271 (Utah 1998). Here, the Court found the Lawrences not liable for fraud, 
but liable for the conspiracy. See Initial Findings, ffif 60-65. A true and correct copy of 
the trial court's Initial Findings are attached to the Lawrences' opening Brief as 
Addendum "A." 
2 
The central finding of the Judgment against the Lawrences for conspiracy to 
defraud is Initial Finding, % 54, that Mr. Wong fraudulently failed to disclose to 
Intermountain he was promised $10,000 in exchange for his signature on the Leases.1 
Ms. Lawrence is then found in *[ 60 to have "participated in the $10,000 offered to Mr. 
Wong," although in footnote 15, the lower court could not "conclude that Ms. Lawrence 
had an affirmative duty to disclose that inducement to Intermountain, or that her failure to 
disclose the inducement constituted a misrepresentation by material omission." Then, Mr. 
Lawrence is found in f 64 to have participated in the inducement "[b]ecause Mr. and Mrs. 
Lawrence were married and cohabitating at the time ...." The stretch in this finding, and 
its lack of logic, is obvious. Utmost, these Initial Findings are contrary to the facts2 and 
law and must be reversed. 
The plain and simple fact is the Leases do not prohibit Mr. Wong from obtaining 
the leased vehicles on behalf of a principal. See Trial Exhibits 1, 4 & 7. Unlike real 
property mortgages, there is no language in the Bank of America Lease, attached to Trial 
Exhibit 23, which prohibits anyone from paying an inducement fee to the lessee. That 
1
 Intermountain claims on p. 27 the Lawrences "implicitly concede ... Wayne Wong engaged in 
fraud ...." Pursuant to Rule 4, UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY, "Lawyers 
shall never knowingly attribute to other counsel a position or claim that counsel has not taken or 
seek to create such an unjustified inference or otherwise seek to create a 'record' that has not 
occurred." Nowhere in their opening Brief do the Lawrences concede, implicitly or explicitly, 
this fact. Furthermore, as argued herein, they contest any such fact. 
2
 Intermountain claims, in pp. 25-26 of its Brief, failure of the duty to marshal the evidence. As 
is clear in the argument herein, the Lawrences use the trial court's actual findings to show its 
conclusions of conspiracy to defraud and conversion are in error. 
3 
Lease, in f^ 16(f), contains the following integration clause: "This Lease constitutes the 
entire Agreement between you and me; there are not other agreements, oral, written or 
otherwise."3 Accordingly, Mr. Watkins5 claim in Initial Findings, | 10, that 
Intermountain would never have leased the vehicles had it known of the $10,000 payment 
to Mr. Wong, upon which the lower court relied in finding fraud, is contrary to the Leases 
and should not have served as the basis of any duty to disclose. Mr. Watkins5 subjective 
understanding of the Leases was not expressed to cSave.net, Wayne Wong, Paul 
Schwenke or any other party at the time the Leases were entered into or subsequently. 
His understanding was not part of the contracts. See Richter v. United Cat. Theatres, Inc., 
Ill CaLApp. 2d 126 (1960)("Contracts are the result of what people say, not what they 
intend to say.55) Mr. Watkins5 claim and thus Initial Findings, fflf 10 & 55, and all 
findings based thereon, fail. Specifically, they fail for the following reasons: 
(1) The integration clause should be enforced. 
Mr. Watkins, the owner of Intermountain, claimed at trial he would not have 
leased the three vehicles to Mr. Wong had he known Mr. Wong was being paid $10,000 
as an inducement fee. Initial Findings, f 10, Trial Transcript, Vol. I., p. 34. However, the 
Lease, which was simultaneously assigned to Bank of America, contains no provision 
barring the payment of an inducement fee nor does it require the disclosure of any 
inducement fee. Mr. Watkins subjective understanding of the Lease agreement and his 
3
 The Isuzu Leases, likewise, contained no language prohibiting an inducement fee. 
4 
unexpressed intent not to lease if he had known about the $10,000 inducement is contrary 
to the Lease and should not be considered part of the contract. The lower court's reliance 
on Mr. Watkins' statement was in error because the statement was only his unexpressed 
subjective understanding of the contract, not the contract itself. The contract contains a 
clear integration clause. Where there is an integration clause, such statements should not 
be considered. See Dairies v. Vincent, 190 P3d 1269,1275 (Utah 2008).* 
Intermountain, in making its conversion claim discussed below, insists upon 
enforcing the Lease term prohibiting anyone but Mr. Wong from possessing the Black 
Rodeo, except for occasional and incidental use. Intermountain should not be permitted 
to enforce a provision of the Lease which it believes is favorable (unpermitted use) while 
choosing to ignore another provision (the integration clause) which is unfavorable. 
(2) There can be no material omission without a duty to speak and there is no such 
duty in a commercial transaction. 
In order to be liable for a fraudulent failure to disclose, there must be a duty to 
disclose. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Development Corp., 786 P.2d 
1326, 1328-29 (Utah 1990). Wayne Wong had no duty to disclose the $10,000 
inducement to Intermountain. A duty to disclose must arise somewhere other than in Mr. 
Watkins' unexpressed thoughts. As set forth above, there was no duty to disclose set 
forth in the Leases themselves, even though Bank of America, Isuzu or Intermountain 
4
 This argument was presented to the Court as found in Trial Trans., Vol IV., pp. 497-498. 
5 
could have included such a provision. In a commercial transaction, where the parties deal 
with each other at arm's-length, there is no duty to disclose similar to that of parties 
dealing with each other based upon a fiduciary or some other form of trust relationship. 
See, e.g., Matter of Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1994). The only basis 
the trial court found for holding Mr. Wong had a duty to disclose the $10,000 payment 
was Mr. Watkins statement he would not leased had he knew about the $10,000 payment. 
This, however, is not sufficient upon which to find a duty to disclose, the breach thereof, 
and the imputation of the breach to the Lawrences. 
B. Even if Wayne Wong's failure to disclose is a fraudulent omission, such omission 
cannot be attributed to the Lawrences. 
Even if failure to disclose to Intermountain the $10,000 payment was a 
misrepresentation on the part of Wayne Wong, giving liability to fraud on his part, the 
payment by itself was not barred by any law and there is no evidence the Lawrences knew 
of Mr. Wong's failure to disclose. The piece of evidence relied on by the lower court to 
reach a finding of fraud by Wayne Wong and participation in that fraud by the Lawrences 
is $10,000 payment to Wayne Wong by cSave.net for his signature on the leases. 
This finding, however, does not create any nexus, let alone a sufficient nexus, to 
find the Lawrences participated in the fraud. The finding does not establish the 
Lawrences participated in any misrepresentation to Intermountain or understood the 
transaction to be anything other than a run-of-the-mill corporate lease. Indeed, the lower 
court found the Lawrences had no duty to disclose the $10,000 inducement to 
6 
Intermountain. See Initial Findings, n. 15. The finding, reached via a judicial admission, 
the Lawrences knew of the $10,000 payment to Mr. Wong does not establish knowledge 
of Wayne Wong's failure to disclose the inducement to Intermountain. Even if the 
judicial admission is accepted as fact, it still does not suggest the Lawrences knew of, let 
alone participated in, any misrepresentation to Intermountain. In order to find the 
Lawrences liable for conspiracy, the trial court would have had to find they participated in 
the fraud or acted in concert with Wayne Wong. See Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 
875 (Utah 1978) ("[Circumstances may be such to impose liability for representation 
made by others as where parties jointly participate in fraud. Conspiracy is an example 
thereof ...") (emphasis added). The trial court did not find facts sufficient to hold, by 
clear and convincing evidence, the Lawrences participated in the fraud. 
A principal may compensate an agent to conduct the principal's business 
transactions. An agent may sign a contract on behalf of a principal without disclosing the 
agency relationship. See AM. JUR. Agency, § 305: 
From the very nature of the situation, the third person's rights do not depend upon 
his or her knowledge that the agent was acting for someone else, because it is 
evident that anyone dealing with an agent for a wholly undisclosed principal 
believes that he or she is dealing with the agent only and relies solely upon the 
agent individually. 
Agents may be compensated for entering into lease agreements on behalf of principals. 
See 2A C J.S. Agency, § 220. A vendor or lessor may choose to extend credit to an agent, 
rather than the principal, if the vendor so chooses. See, e.g., Dinkier Management Corp. 
1 
v. Stein, 155 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. App. 1967); Brandes v. Illinois Children's Protestant 
Home, Inc., 179 N.E.2d 425 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1962); Wakefield Fortune Inc. v. Brown, 
148 N.Y.S. 2d 633 (N.Y. Sup. 1956). Although a party may seek recourse against an 
undisclosed principal for breach of contract, Wayne Wong's principals (cSave.net and 
Paul Schwenke) were disclosed to Intermountain as set forth herein. 
CSave.net paid its agent, Wayne Wong, $10,000 to enter into leases on behalf of 
cSave.net. cSave.net's involvement was disclosed by its initial communication to 
Intermountain on cSave.net letterhead (Trial Exhibit #10) and by providing Intermountain 
cSave.net's Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement. See Initial Findings, \ 15 
and Trial Exhibits 13 & 17. However, even if cSave.net's principal relationship to Wayne 
Wong was not disclosed, it was not required to do so. 
The law does not prohibit inducements. Here, cSave.net's payment to Wayne 
Wong to enter the Leases with Intermountain was not fraudulent in and of itself. The 
only misrepresentation found by the trial court pertaining to the Lawrences was Wayne 
Wong's alleged failure to disclose he was offered $10,000 by cSave.net to enter into the 
transactions. See Initial Findings, f^l[54, 61 and 65. However, even if Wayne Wong's 
failure to disclose can serve as the basis of fraud, knowledge of his failure to disclose 
cannot be attributed to the Lawrences. How can the Lawrences be found liable for 
Wayne Wong's failure to disclose the $10,000 payment, when the trial court found no 
duty to disclose on the part of the Lawrences? How can the Lawrences be found liable 
8 
for conspiracy to defraud where they made no misrepresentation to Intermountain and 
where they made no attempt to conceal from Intermountain that cSave.net was the true 
lessee? 
The lower court's finding of conspiracy to defraud as against the Lawrences in 
Initial Findings, ffl[ 61 & 64 should be reversed because such findings cannot be sustained 
under a clear and convincing evidence standard. See In Re WDW, 224 P.3d 14,19 (Wyo. 
2010) ("evidence is 'clear and convincing' if it would persuade a trier of fact that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable). Under Utah law, a trial court's determination 
under a clear and convincing burden of proof is reviewed for clear error. See hunt v. 
Lance, 186 P.3d 978. 983 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). Here, the lower court clearly erred in 
finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy because there was no requirement in the 
Leases or anywhere else that Wayne Wong and/or the Lawrences disclose the $10,000 
payment to Intermountain. 
POINT 1. THERE WERE NO OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTS TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING OF CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD. 
The other findings of fact made by the lower court do not support a finding of 
conspiracy to defraud against the Lawrences. Initial Findings, ffi[ 61(a) and 65(a), both 
determined West Valley Dodge repossessed a Durango from the Lawrences which "had 
been leased by Mr. Schwenke under a similar arrangement." Exactly what the lower 
court meant by a "similar arrangement" is not described. From the language of If 69 of 
the Complaint, Trial Exhibit 24, it appears Ms. Lawrence had authorization from a limited 
9 
liability company to possess a green Durango. There is nothing unlawful about what is 
alleged and nothing more set forth in the Complaint to imply unlawfulness. In fact, the 
lower court had "no knowledge concerning the outcome of the case ... and makes no 
findings regarding that case." Initial Finding, f 40, footnote 9. Accordingly, it is not 
known if the repossession was ultimately determined to be improper, if the vehicles were 
paid for or, for example, if the dispute centered over other allegations dissimilar to the 
instant case. It, therefore, lacks probative value and is not an unlawful act. 
Initial Findings y§ 61(c) and 65(c) stated the Lawrences were present at the signing 
of the leases and were "generally aware of the financial terms." As set forth below, their 
presence is another indicium that Intermountain knew the vehicles, especially the Black 
Rodeo, would not be possessed by Mr. Wong. A finding they were "generally aware of 
the financial terms," corresponds with Initial Finding Tf 12 that they "both were aware that 
the monthly payments on the vehicles were supposed to be approximately $360." It is not 
a finding, however, that they were aware of the Lease terms regarding possession, 
insurance or similar non-financial terms and there is nothing unlawful about their 
presence at the closing. 
Initial Findings ffif 61(d) and 65(d) state the Lawrences had no present intent of 
making any payments. This is true; as the trial court found in f^ 6, Mr. Schwenke intended 
to lease a vehicle for Mr. and Ms. Lawrence as partial payment for legal services rendered 
...." There is nothing unlawful about such an arrangement. 
10 
Concerning Tffl 61(e) and 65(e), see the Lawrences opening Brief, at pp. 29-30. 
Even the filing of a frivolous lawsuit is not unlawful As to Tf 65(f), see the discussion 
regarding guilt by marriage on p. 26 of the Lawrences' opening Brief.5 
The trial court also found Mr. Wong did not insure the vehicles. The issue of 
insurance is troubling, not because of anything Lawrences did, but rather because of what 
Intermountain failed to do. Accompanying each Lease was a First Security Bank 
insurance form, requiring endorsement of "the Policy Standard Loss Payable Clause" and 
providing immediate delivery of "written evidence of such coverage ...." "In the event 
evidence of such coverage is not received .... First Security [presumably Bank of 
America and Isuzu] may, at their option, apply for coverage as required...." See Exhibits 
3, 6, and 9. Intermountain5 s dealer agreement with Isuzu, Trial Exhibit 37, mandates on 
page 16 that each "vehicle must be covered by liability land physical damage insurance 
naming IMAC [Isuzu Motors Acceptance Corporation] as additional insured and loss 
payee." Further, Intermountain on page 18 is "fully responsible for errors ..." Paragraph 
1 of the Assignment of the Black Rodeo from Bank of America to Intermountain 
specifically "assigns all of its [Bank of America] rights as an insured or loss payee under 
a contract of insurance...." Finally, the Isuzu leases contained a provision that Isuzu must 
5
 Intermountain conceded in its Brief on p. 43 that none of subparagraphs "(a) - (f) [of f f 61 and 
65] involve wrongful conduct." Intermountain urges this Court to "reasonably infer wrongful 
conduct" where none is actually found. This is contrary to the admonishment of this Court in 
Israel Pagan Estate that civil conspiracy may only be found from one or more unlawful, overt 
acts. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 745, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
11 
be named an insured in the insurance policy. See Trial Exhibits 4 & 7, paragraph 15(a). 
Intermountain was negligent in failing to provide, through its Finance and 
Insurance Department, insurance coverage of the leased vehicles until the vehicles were 
returned or recovered. The Silver Rodeo, having been in an accident, was recovered in 
November 2000. See Initial Finding, *| 27. By then, Intermountain had actual notice Mr. 
Wong and cSave.net had not insured the vehicles themselves. The Black Rodeo was not 
damaged until long after November 2000. See Initial Finding, ]f 29. Had Intermountain 
insured the vehicle, as required to do, it would have been made whole for the loss of the 
vehicle. A court will not help a party who was damaged through its own negligence. See, 
e.g., First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. in Lamed v. Wetzel, 219 P.3d 819, 824 (Kan. App. 
2009)("Equity cannot be invoked to relieve one of the consequences of his own 
negligence.")(internal citation omitted). 
POINT 3. THE LOWER COURT'S DETERMINATION THE LAWRENCES 
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO POSSESSION OF THE BLACK RODEO PRIOR TO 
JANUARY 31, 2001 SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Intermountain seeks to enforce the Lease provision limiting possession of the 
Black Rodeo to Mr. Wong. 6 However, based upon the facts and applicable law, the 
Lawrences were entitled to possession. Intermountain certainly knew Wayne Wong was 
not leasing three vehicles for himself. The day before Mr. Wong appeared at 
6
 Again, Intermountain accuses the Lawrences of failure to marshal the evidence. The gravamen 
of the trial court's determination of conversion is that the Lawrences "possession of the Black 
Rodeo was never lawful under the terms of the lease." Initial Findings, Yl 62 & 66. No 
12 
Intermountain to sign the leases, cSave.net faxed a letter to Intermountain on its 
letterhead indicating its interest in leasing three vehicles. See Trial Exhibit #10. The 
lower court took note of this fact in footnote 2 of its Initial Findings by stating, "Mr. 
Schwenke's initial communication with Intermountain was a facsimile on cSave.net 
letterhead, dated March 29, 2000." The lower court also noted in Initial Finding f 6, "Mr. 
Schwenke also intended to lease a vehicle for Mr* and Ms. Lawrence's personal use as 
partial compensation for legal services rendered by Mr. Lawrence." Mr. Schwenke was a 
business client of Mr. Lawrence. Initial Finding, ^ 4. Also, cSave.net's Articles of 
Organization and Operating Agreement were provided to Intermountain. See Initial 
Findings, Tf 15 and Trial Exhibits 13 & 17. Further, cSave.net's balance sheet, tax 
identification number and P&L were provided to Intermountain. See Trial Exhibits 14 & 
15. Additionally, cSave.net's loan application to the Larry H. Miller Group was in 
Intermountain5s deal jacket. See Trial Exhibit 19. 
Finally, the fact Mr. Wong leased three vehicles, instead of just one, served to 
signal to Intermountain he wasn't leasing them for just himself, but on behalf of others. 
"On or about March 31, 2000, Mr. Schwenke, Wilma, Tania and Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence 
each went to Intermountain's offices for the purpose of selecting the three vehicles." 
Initial Finding, ^ 11. ^Following Mr. Wong's signing of the leases, each of the original 
plaintiffs except Mr. Wong took possession of the vehicles. Mr. Schwenke and Wilma 
marshalling, other than reference to the Lease terms, is mandated. 
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took possession of a silver Isuzu Rodeo (the "Silver Rodeo"), Tania took possession of a 
green Isuzu Rodeo (the "Green Rodeo"), and Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence took possession of a 
black Isuzu Rodeo (the "Black Rodeo")." Initial Findings, % 19. Without doubt, 
Intermountain gave possession of all three vehicles to individuals other than Mr. Wong. 
Intermountain even accepted a $3,000 personal check from Mr. Lawrence for the down 
payment for each of the three vehicles. Initial Finding, | 12. Taking into consideration 
all of the facts listed above, it would require a stretch of the imagination to believe 
Intermountain did not know it was negotiating a group lease, and not just with Mr. Wong 
individually. It would take an even greater stretch of the imagination to find the 
Lawrences were attempting to commit conversion, perpetrating or profiting from a fraud, 
or acting in willful and wonton disregard of Intermountain's rights sufficient to support 
an award of punitive damages. There is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing 
evidence, that the Lawrences viewed the transaction as anything other than a corporate 
lease. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1958)(clear and convincing "implies 
something more than the usual requirement of a preponderance, or greater weight, of the 
evidence ...."). 
Even though Bank of America, as the subsequent owner of the vehicle and 
presumably bona fide purchaser, may have been able to enforce the Lease provision 
limiting the use of the vehicle to the named lessee, Intermountain waived its right and is 
estopped from enforcing that provision when it knew other parties were driving the 
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vehicles and did not object7 See Red Cliffs, LLC v. 11 Hunan, Inc., 219 P.3d 619 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2009)(waiver is the relinquishment of a known right). For the elements of 
equitable estoppel, please see Bahr v. Imus, 211 P.3d 987, 989 (Utah Ct. App. 
2009)(elements of equitable estoppels are "a ... failure to act [that is] inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action ... taken ... on the basis of the ... failure to act; 
and (iii) injury ... would result from allowing [a repudiation of] such ... failure to act." 
Intermountain cannot be accorded the status of "bona fide purchaser" because it had full 
knowledge Mr. Wong was not driving the vehicles himself See lohnson v. Higley, 989 
P.2d 61, 70 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Here, Intermountain was aware, at the signing of the 
leases and the departure of the vehicles from its lots, that individuals other than Mr. 
Wong were driving the vehicles. Intermountain thereby waived its right to subsequently 
claim the Lawrences had no right to possession. Clearly, the Lawrences had the right to 
possession through January 31, 2001. For the same reasons, there was no conversion of 
the Silver or Green Rodeos based upon allegedly non-permissive use. 
POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING VICTOR LAWRENCE LIABLE 
FOR CONVERSION AFTER HE RETURNED IT TO CSAVE.NET 
The lower court's finding Victor Lawrence liable for conversion of the Black 
7
 Intermountain pleaded waiver and estoppel as affirmative defenses. See R735 et seq. 
8
 This argument was presented to the lower court during closing argument, Trial Transcript Vol. 
IV, p. 495 ("Everybody that was there, an all the evidence in the deal jacket suggests that 
everybody thought Wayne Wong was going to be the second guy on the deal, the guarantor, the 
co-signor..."). 
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Rodeo after January 31, 2001, when he no longer possessed it, was in error, 
intermountain argues Mr. Lawrence's decision to return the vehicle to the owner of 
cSave.net, which is Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong, after he learned Intermountain claimed 
the right to possess it, constituted a continuing conversion of the automobile. 
Intermountain relies on a single case to support its proposition - Queen v. Lynch 
Jewelers, LLC, 55 P.3d 914 (Kan. App, 2002). However, Queen v. Lynch Jewelers did 
not address the question of whether an individual may be liable for conversion when the 
individual does not possess or control the chattel. 
Intermountain's claim of conversion rests on the assertion Mr. Lawrence refused to 
surrender the chattel to Intermountain and misdelivered it to cSave.net. The Restatement 
(Second) Torts § 237, cited by Intermountain in its brief, states a possessor is to return a 
chattel when it is demanded by its rightful owner. However, there are exceptions to the 
general rule. For example, a possessor does not become a converter by making a refusal 
to surrender the chattel to the claimant for the purpose of affording a reasonable 
opportunity to inquire into such a right. 
Here, the circumstances under which Intermountain demanded an immediate 
return of the vehicle were unreasonable. Intermountain attempted a repossession of the 
vehicle at Mr. Lawrence's place of business. Mr. Lawrence was unaware, until that day, 
that Intermountain claimed the right to possess. Mr. Lawrence, when he learned 
Intermountain was attempting to repossess, confronted Intermountain and requested they 
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either discuss with him the situation or leave. Because of the physical confrontation 
between Mr. Lawrence and Intermountain's principal, the police were summoned. 
Intermountain's assignment from Bank of America was presented to the police officer. 
Upon reviewing the assignment, the police resolved the situation by telling Mr. Lawrence 
he could take the vehicle with him. See Trial Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 372, lines 7-19. It 
was then that Mr. Lawrence returned the vehicle to cSave.net so cSave.net could resolve 
its dispute with Intermountain. Intermountain's harsh tactic in seeking repossession was 
an unreasonable demand for return of the vehicle and Mr. Lawrence's refusal to return it 
was reasonable. To proceed with self-help procedures when confronted with a breach of 
the peace is a violation of the self-help remedy under Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-609(2)(b), By even orally protesting the repossession, many 
cases hold that a debtor prohibits the creditor's right to possess the collateral. White & R. 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 26-6, p. 110-11 (2d ed 1980). 
Further, Mr. Lawrence committed no conversion by delivering the vehicle to 
cSave.net, which is comprised of Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Wong. Although Intermountain 
claimed the right to possess the vehicle, its actual legal right to do so was in doubt at that 
time. Intermountain only presented a piece of paper to the police officer indicating 
ownership of the vehicle had been reassigned to Intermouritain from the lender. See Trial 
Transcript, Vol. Ill, p. 372, lines 7-19. In Underwood v. Dillon Companies^ 936 P.2d 612 
(Colo. App. Ct. 1997), the lessee of computer equipment refused to return the equipment 
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to the lessor upon terms demanded by the lessor. The lessor sued the lessee for 
conversion. The court held, "A bailee may refuse to surrender an item of personal 
property in order to investigate the bailor's rights to return of the property if the bailee 
distinctly communicates the reason for the qualified refusal to the bailor." Id. at 614. 
Here, when Mr. Lawrence realized Intermountain claimed the right to possess the vehicle, 
lie refused to surrender it but turned it over to cSave.net so it could resolve the dispute. 
Mr. Lawrence testified at trial that he inquired of the parties at the repossession whether 
there was a court order [writ of replevin]. Upon learning there was no writ of replevin, he 
asserted his present right to the vehicle and communicated his wish to have the courts 
decide who had the ultimate right to it. The police allowed him to keep the vehicle. Trial 
Transcript, Vol. II, pp. 242 - 244. His refusal to surrender the vehicle to Intermountain 
on January 31, 2001 and his choice to return it to cSave.net does not make him a 
converter. 
Intermountain argues Mr. Lawrence knew Wayne Wong was the lessee. Mr. 
Lawrence only knew Wayne Wong was the personal guarantor of three leases entered 
into on behalf of cSave.net. See Trans., Vol. I, p. 193, lines 20 & 21; Trans., Vol. I, p. 
194, line 20 through p., 195, line5 ; Trans, Vol. I, p. 199, lines 9 -17; & Trans, Vol. II, 
p. 220, lines 1-6. Intermountain further argues Mr. Lawrence knew "Schwenke 
intended not to surrender the vehicle to Intermountain or to Bank of America." See 
Appellee Brief, p. 50. The trial court made no such finding and Intermountain offers no 
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authority for ascertaining Mr. Lawrence's purported knowledge of the future actions of 
Mr. Schwenke. On January 31, 2001, Mr. Lawrence ascertained only a contractual 
dispute between cSave.net and Intermountain, not the grand fraudulent scheme 
Intermountain presented to the trial court. 
POINT 5. THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE ITS UNDERLYING FINDINGS WERE IN ERROR 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-8-201(l) states, 
[PJunitive damages may be awarded only if ... it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
others. 
The trial court based its finding of punitive damages against the Lawrences on its finding 
they "conspired to defraud Intermountain" and their conduct "constitute^] knowing and 
reckless indifference toward Intermountain.95 See Initial Findings, If 67. As argued 
herein, the trial court's finding the Lawrences liable for conspiracy to defraud was in 
error; Wayne Wong's failure to disclose $10,000 in consideration was not unlawful and 
cannot be imputed to the Lawrences. Further, no other unlawful acts were found and the 
Lawrences did not commit conversion. For these reasons, the imposition of punitive 
damages was also in error. 
The trial court also imposed punitive damages on Mr. Lawrence because he turned 
the Black Rodeo over to cSave.net upon learning of Intermountain9s attempted 
repossession. See Initial Findings, f^ 66. It was not wrongful to do so and therefore Mr. 
19 
Lawrence's decision does not meet the clear and convincing threshold of proving willful, 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent behavior which would give rise to punitive damages. 
See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991)(willful and 
malicious conduct is "conduct which manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of others"). Rather, Mr. Lawrence's decision was 
reasonable in light of all circumstances. He did not know at that time who had the right 
to possess the vehicle, but understood cSave.net to be the lessee. He was not presented 
with a writ of replevin or other court order establishing Intermountain's legal right to the 
vehicle. The police officer on the scene who inspected the re-assignment to 
Intermountain resolved the immediate situation by indicating Mr. Lawrence should leave 
with the vehicle. See Initial Findings, <[ 28. Mr. Lawrence's decision, at worst, was an 
honest error. However, there is nothing to suggest he did anything improper by 
relinquishing the vehicle to the entity who provided it to him. 
POINT 6. ALTERNATIVELY, THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
CALCULATED USING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THE DENOMINATOR 
AND THE LAWRENCES9 CONDUCT WAS NOT REPREHENSIBLE 
A. Prejudgment Interest 
Intermountain argues the inclusion of prejudgment interest in the denominator 
when calculating punitive damages is appropriate. See Appellee Brief, p. 59. In support 
of its argument, Intermountain relies on Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 
App. 1987)("Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages ...") 
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However, Vasels did not address punitive damages at all, let alone conclude prejudgment 
interest should be included when calculating punitive damages. 
It does not make sense to include prejudgment interest in the baseline calculation 
when computing punitive damages. For example, two parties suffering the same injury 
on the same date by the same act of a defendant will obtain variant punitive damage 
awards if one plaintiffs case goes to trial at a later date than the other. Sucfr cannot be the 
result intended by the statute allowing for punitive damag.es. It could create a perverse 
incentive for plaintiffs*to drag their cases out in order to increase the dollar amount of 
pre-judgment interest and thereby increase the amount of punitive damages. Again, if the 
court were to include prejudgment interest in calculating punitive damages, the punitive 
damage amount would increase the longer it took to try the case, not because the harm to 
the plaintiff was greater, but because it took longer to reach a verdict regarding the 
amount of compensatory damages. Essentially, pre-judgment interest is meant to fully 
restore the plaintiff with respect to compensatory damages, but not to augment punitive 
damages. 
Although sometimes prejudgment interest has been included in calculating 
punitive damages, see Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), other 
cases have separated it from the calculation. See Kealamalda, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 213 
P.3d 13 (Utah Ct App. 2009). It appears the Court has never directly addressed the issue. 
Here, if the punitive damage award against the Lawrences is to remain, it should be 
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recalculated to exclude pre-judgment interest from the baseline calculation. 
B. The Lawrences' conduct was not reprehensible. 
"The most important indicium of punitive the reasonableness of a punitive 
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." State Farm 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). The case is, at its heart, about 
Intermountain's failure to get paid on three leases and eventual loss of three vehicles, 
only one of which was ever possessed by the Lawrences. The fair rental value of the 
Black Rodeo of the period of time the Lawrences possessed it was $3,625.40. For this, 
Victor Lawrence was adjudged liable to Intermountain for over $600,000 and Cindy 
Lawrence was adjudged liable for over $200,000. 
The Supreme Court has instructed courts: 
"to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether: the harm 
caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced 
indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of 
the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or 
was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Of the five factors listed above, only one has potential application to the present matter. 
The harm caused to Intermountain was economic, not physical. The conduct did not 
involve indifference to health or safety. Intermountain was not financially vulnerable. 
The conduct was not repeated.9 The only applicable factor to determine the 
9
 Although the trial court stated, "the evidence at trial strongly suggested that Lawrence and 
Schwenke had orchestrated a similar fraud before," it entered no finding of such previous 
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reprehensibility of the Lawrences' conduct is whether such conduct involved trickery or 
deceit. The trial court found the Lawrences benefited from a misrepresentation made by 
Wayne Wong. However, as argued herein, there was no unlawful conduct to support any 
finding of conspiracy to defraud nor was the Lawrences' possession of the Black Rodeo 
wrongful. Such conduct is certainly not reprehensible. 
conduct and there is no evidence of such conduct, 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this yn day of April, 2010. 
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